Foundations

The practice draws on several intellectual traditions. We list them because the work doesn’t run on a single school of thought or method, and each one contributes something specific to how we listen and design what we do.

They also don’t agree with each other. Existential thought treats a person as radically free to choose; liberation psychology holds that the conditions largely choose for them. Psychoanalysis makes universal claims about how minds work, which uncolonial practice exists to question. Autoethnographic re-authoring assumes an account can be remade, while the work on plasticity refuses any guarantee that what comes after damage is recovery.

We haven’t resolved these, and we’re not trying to. Every framework here reaches a point where it stops explaining, and a tradition that never contradicts anything is usually one that has stopped being useful…

Existential Philosophy

What it means to live, act, and choose in conditions without guarantees.

Existential thinking takes seriously the fact that people have to make decisions about meaning, responsibility, and direction without external certainty about what’s right. We work with this rather than around it. The question isn’t how to remove ambiguity from a person’s situation. It’s how to support someone to act inside it.

The thinkers we draw on include Paul Tillich, Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, and Rollo May, alongside writers and practitioners whose existential thinking emerged from their own conditions of displacement, oppression, and survival. We use existential philosophy as a working orientation, not as an academic frame applied to a person’s experience from outside it.

In practice this means accompanying people through rupture, exile, identity change, and moral exhaustion without trying to resolve those experiences into a single coherent narrative. The work tolerates not-knowing without collapsing into it.

Liberation Psychology

Locating distress in its political and social context.

Liberation psychology, developed by Ignacio Martín-Baró in El Salvador in the 1980s, insists that the psyche cannot be understood independently of the political conditions that shape it. Trauma produced by structural violence cannot be treated as if it were a private matter, and clinical models that pretend otherwise tend to reproduce the harm they claim to address.

Our work foregrounds the historical, economic, racial, and gendered conditions that produce distress. We attend to internalised oppression, collective memory, and the question of what repair means when the harm is structural. We draw on conscientisation, community memory, and popular education as practical methods, not as concepts.

The core question liberation psychology asks is: who benefits when suffering is individualised? It’s a question we carry into every kind of work the practice does.

Psychoanalytic Inquiry

Listening for what isn’t said directly.

Psychoanalytic thinking, used as a way of listening rather than as a clinical framework, gives us tools for working with transference, repetition, and the patterns that shape relationships under the surface of what people are saying. We’re attentive to language, affect, embodiment, and the moments when something in the room shifts without anyone naming why.

The thinkers we return to include Winnicott, Fanon, Kristeva, and Bion, alongside writers working on migration, family systems, and the politics of memory. We treat the unconscious as something that operates in groups, institutions, and political life, not only in individual minds. The patterns that show up in a one-to-one conversation also show up in organisations under pressure, in classrooms, in the silences that accumulate in environments that punish dissent.

This is why psychoanalytic attention matters to facilitation and group work, not just to clinical practice. The relational field of any encounter carries more information than its surface content.

Complex Trauma and Plasticity

What prolonged exposure produces, and what change after it actually involves.

Most trauma frameworks were built around event-based incidents — a discrete thing that happened, with a defined before and after. Much of what frontline workers live with doesn’t fit that shape. Sustained exposure, ongoing surveillance, repeated harm, contexts that don’t stabilise: these produce psychological responses that the original trauma literature wasn’t designed to describe.

Judith Herman’s work on complex trauma opened that ground clinically. The picture is different from event-based PTSD. Identity, trust, capacity to relate, and the experience of time itself can shift under sustained strain, and the response doesn’t resolve through brief intervention because the conditions producing it don’t resolve.

Catherine Malabou’s work on plasticity opens the philosophical question of what change after such experience can mean. She argues that the brain, and by extension the person, is plastic in two directions: shaped by experience and, sometimes, reshaped by it in ways that don’t restore an earlier self. Programmes here are designed for people whose exposure is ongoing, and they don’t treat strain as a problem to be cleared so the person can return to a previous version of themselves.

Liminal Spaces

Working at thresholds where something new might form.

Liminality, named by Arnold van Gennep in 1909 and developed by Victor Turner in the 1960s, describes the in-between phases of a transition. The rules of the old position no longer apply and the rules of the new one haven’t yet been established. These periods are unsettling and they’re also where genuine reformation tends to happen.

We work with this concept because so many of the people the practice serves are living through it. Gloria Anzaldúa called the borderland between identities nepantla — at once painful and generative. Homi Bhabha’s third space describes the cultural in-between that the practice takes its name from. These are not abstract ideas for us. They map onto the actual conditions of migration, adoption, exile, faith change, and the fractured affiliations of working across institutions that don’t speak the same language.

In practice, we resist rushing people toward coherence. We let unresolved things stay unresolved when that’s the more honest position. Some thresholds are crossed quickly. Others are lived in for years.

Uncolonial Practice

Refusing imperial scripts without claiming to decolonise.

We don’t claim to decolonise. As Tuck and Yang argue, decolonisation is not a metaphor — it is material, Indigenous-led, and tied to land and sovereignty. To speak loosely of “decolonising” therapy, education, or organisations risks treating real political work as a register of self-improvement.

Our orientation is uncolonial. That means loosening the grip of colonial categories in how we listen, teach, and design work. It means decentring whiteness and questioning the Western frameworks that present themselves as universal, while refusing the purity narratives or guilt-management postures that often substitute for actual practice. We draw on practices of opacity, relation, and imagination, and we learn from Indigenous knowledge where invited.

Uncolonial practice also refuses the fantasy of a recoverable original self. The idea that there is one authentic country, one true identity, or one real self waiting underneath the layers of displacement is itself a colonial inheritance. The practice attends instead to the multiplicity of how people actually live: fractured, hybrid, diasporic, adopted, translated. It doesn’t ask any of that to resolve into a single story.

Theology

The sacred as a live orientation, not a relic we work around.

Most therapeutic and educational frameworks treat religion as content to be handled sensitively, and secularism as the neutral room the handling happens in. We don’t do that. Instead, the questions our work turns on, from suffering, meaning, repair, what a person is for, are theological before they are clinical in our view. Handled by a frame that can’t name them, they don’t disappear, they just go unaddressed.

In Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad takes apart the assumption that the secular is what remains once religion recedes, or that it stands on the side of reason. It is a category with its own history, bound up with modernity, democracy and human rights, and one of its powers is deciding what counts as religion in the first place. Marika Rose puts it more directly in Modern Believing: Western notions of the secular are themselves deeply Christian, and the history of Western philosophical thought is more or less inseparable from Christian theology, so to talk about that inheritance is always also to talk about colonialism, racism and capitalism. Secular neutrality is a particular formation that learned to present itself as universal, and it travelled outward with empire.

The thinkers we draw on include Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich, John Caputo and Peter Rollins, who between them ask what Christianity is once God has stopped functioning as an explanation for anything. Liberation theology reaches the same refusal from the other side, and the liberation psychology described above grew out of it.

In practice this means we don’t impose a religious reading on anyone, and we treat a secular reading as a position rather than the absence of one. We think from a Christian formation because it is the tradition we can argue with properly. Most of the people we work with hold other traditions, or none, and we meet those on their own terms.

 

Narrative and Epistemic Justice

 Who counts as a legitimate knower.

Miranda Fricker’s term is for the injustice a person suffers in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice is when an account is discounted because of who is giving it. Hermeneutical injustice is when the language for an experience isn’t there, so a person can’t name what happened to them, sometimes not even to themselves. Walter Mignolo’s point is that this was built rather than accidental. Colonial modernity set up one place from which knowledge could properly be produced and dismissed the rest as belief, folklore or anecdote. Epistemic disobedience means refusing that arrangement rather than applying to join it.

Autoethnography is where we work with this. It treats the person who lived something as capable of thinking about it, so an account becomes evidence of how a system works rather than material for someone else to analyse. It supplies words where there weren’t any, which is the practical answer to hermeneutical injustice. It lets what is felt and carried in the body count as knowledge rather than as colour around the real findings. And it breaks the split between the expert who knows and the subject who is known, which is where most of the harm we see comes from. We draw on Carolyn Ellis and Heewon Chang, and we supervise this research. Re-authoring is what it does: an account gets written, looked at again, written again, and the writing shifts how the writer stands in relation to it.

In practice this runs through everything. Groups are where an account can be given and received rather than defended, which makes a private difficulty something held in common. It also means refusing what this commitment usually turns into. People get asked to tell the story of their own harm over and over so that institutions can learn from it, and nothing changes afterwards about who holds the power. Or a few people get raised up as permanent representatives of an experience, which looks like listening and works as a way of hearing less. We don’t work towards one settled version of anyone’s story. What matters is that the telling stays open, and that the person telling it stays its author.

 

Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing can be changed until it is faced.

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